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1 Introduction
In advanced economies there is a strong popular demand for migration con-
trol. This is perhaps the main lesson we have learned from the UK referen-
dum on Brexit but it is true elsewhere: a recent poll shows that immigration
is now seen by European citizens as the most important issue facing the EU
and 85 percent of all EU citizens surveyed in 2015 agree that additional mea-
sures need to be taken to fight illegal immigration from outside the EU.1 As a 
result of these concerns right-wing parties have recently surged in popularity
throughout Europe. In the US illegal immigration is a heated topic too.2 In 
the past decades border controls have therefore constantly been reinforced.3 
Yet current migration policies, which combine quotas on visas with reinforced
border controls, are fairly ineffective at illegal migration. Their main con-
sequence is to fuel the market for smugglers. Strong restrictions on labour
mobility imply that many candidates are obliged to arrange migration with
the help of intermediaries who organise air, sea or ground transportation
and provide them with forged documents, clothes, food and accommodation
during the trip.
Illegal migrants represent sizeable proportions of foreign populations liv-
ing in high wages countries.4The smuggling markets on these two main 
routes appear to be in the hand of many small smugglers. However, for long
haul migration the smuggling market is more concentrated as it involves
more sophisticated operations and requires larger and broader networks to
transport illegally people over long distance (UNODC 2014). Prices are also
higher for long distance migration.5 This makes human smuggling a lucrative 
business.6
1See http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83 first en.pdf
2See https://ballotpedia.org/2016 presidential candidates on immigration
3For instance more than 670 miles of border fences, walls, bollards and spikes decreed
by Congress in 2006 has been completed at an estimated cost of $4 billion (plus future
maintenance). Similarly the Border Patrol, which was increased from 9,000 agents in 2001
to 20,000 in 2009, costs an estimated $4 billion annually.
4In the USA, 11 million of immigrants do not have legal status, representing 3.5 per-
cent of the total population (Morehouse and Blomfield 2010). In the EU15 they were
1.8 to 3.3 million, representing 0.46 percent to 0.83 percent of the population in 2008
(http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/).
5For example, crossing to the UK from Afghanistan with fake identification costs above
GBP25,000 and from China above GBP40,000. See http://www.havocscope.com/black-
market-prices/human-smuggling-fees/
6Total income raised by smugglers who operate between Mexico and the US is estimated
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Over the years, human smuggling has merged with other types of ille-
gal transnational activities such as drug shipping and prostitution (UNODC
2010). These activities pose a threat to the rule of law in countries of origin,
transit, and destination.7 One concern with the actual restrictive migration
policies is that they never explicitly internalize the cost of the negative exter-
nalities (loss of human life, corruption, money laundering, violence, terrorism,
slavery, etc) imposed by the criminal activities that emerge as a result of the
prohibition. The policy makers simply assume that it will work, while the
police is dealing with the criminality in a separate way. From an economic
perspective this is not efficient. Internalizing the costs of crime implies that
the size of the illegal migration business has to be downsized.
This paper proposes legalisation through the sale of visas combined with
sanctions against illegal migration, especially at the worksite, to both weaken
human smuggling and control immigration. Our analysis shows that the sale
of visas at smugglers’ price, or higher, will not be sufficient to eliminate
smugglers. Indeed prohibition creates a barrier to entry into the market.
Criminal organisations rely on this legal barrier, and on violence, to cartelize
the industry and to charge high prices. They will therefore respond to the
sale of visas by lowering their prices.
In this context, a sale of visas will increase migration flows and widen the
skill diversity of migrants. In advanced economies this outcome is difficult to
sustain politically as there is a strong popular demand for migration control.
We explore how a combination of pricing tools and reinforced controls can
be used in a more innovative way to weaken smugglers while achieving pre-
defined migration targets. Our policy combines visa pricing tools to push
the smugglers out of the market and enforced sanctions, especially against
employers of illegal migrants, to limit the subsequent increases in migration
flows.
at 6 billion dollars per year (UNODC 2010). The EU market, which is more fragmented
due to its multiple points of entries, is harder to evaluate. Nevertheless it is sizeable and
is booming since 2015 with the surge of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.
7In Mexico for example, human smuggling is integrated with the drug business and
other criminal activities, which lead to high insecurity and became recently one of the
main electoral concerns. See the blog of the Huffington Post of the 6th of June, 2016:
“Drug Cartels: Where Human Trafficking and Human Smuggling Meet Today.”
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2 A simple framework to analyse
 human smuggling
2.1 Demand for human smuggling services and supply
To understand the effects of current policies on human smuggling, we need
to model both sides of this illegal market and study simultaneously how
smugglers respond to the policies by offering their services (supply side) and
how would-be candidates to migration respond to the policy (demand side).
This framework allows us to analyse how the price charged by smugglers (or
“fees”) respond to different types of policies, which in turn determine the
number and the types of migrants.
When migration is undertaken for economic reasons, it is reasonable to
consider that the number of workers willing to migrate illegally on a specific
route decreases in the price of smugglers’ fees, as well as in the risk of cross-
ing borders illegally, and that it increases in the expected pay-offs of illegal
migration. We analyze how smugglers compete to capture this demand by
offering their services.
A simple economic framework (see more details in Auriol and Mesnard,
2016) shows intuitively that the price they charge for their services increases
in their costs of operation. This price will also decrease in the number of
smugglers competing on the market, which decreases their market power.
So if the market is very competitive, the price will be pushed down until
it reaches the minimum threshold price under which smugglers would do
negative profits. At the other extreme, if only one smuggler operates on the
market, the monopolistic price will be the highest, generating a large rent
for the smuggler, with a large mark-up between the fee and marginal costs to
operate. In any other intermediary situation characterised by an oligopolistic
market, several smugglers will share the rents from the market, which will be
higher (with higher prices), the lower the competition between smugglers.
In addition to the nature of competition, another important determinant
of the price charged by smugglers is the price elasticity of demand, which
increases with the availability of other migration routes or channels open to
would-be migrants: as fees increase on a specific route, candidates may choose
to cross the borders using further away, more risky routes, or use alternative
channels -queuing longer to apply for legal visas, entering the destination
countries as tourists, business-men, students or by their own means. Price
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elasticity can vary across migrants: some individuals are more captive than 
others, which is for example the case of poor individuals without strong 
language or other skills, who have low chances to get temporary visas as 
tourists, skilled labour or entrepreneurs or to cross the borders by their own 
means. Using price discrimination, smugglers can charge them higher prices 
and maximise their rents.
2.2      Effects of r einforced c ontrols
This simple market framework allows us to link the supply and demand sides 
of the markets and study the effects of different types of policies that tighten 
external or internal migration controls. These policies may target either the 
smugglers, the undocumented workers, or their employers, or some combina-
tion of them having all the same objective of deterring illegal migration.
Increasing border controls diminishes the chances for illegal migrants to 
cross the borders illegally by their own means, which increases their reliance 
on smugglers. It also increases the costs for smugglers to operate, which 
inflates the fees they charge to migrants. Moreover, in a dynamic perspec-
tive, destroying smugglers’ vessels or dismantelling their infrastructure and 
networks pushes them to restructure their business. In response, they need 
to strengthen their coordination to operate on larger scale, which reinforces 
the power of transnational mafias. All these short and long run effects result 
in higher prices on the smuggling market. This, in turn, should decrease the 
number of migrants crossing borders illegally with the help of smugglers. Yet, 
the effectiveness of stricter border control at decreasing the number of illegal 
migrants strongly depends on the availability of other migration channels or 
routes, that would-be migrants can choose, and, more generally, on the price 
elasticity of demand. This is an important point, which has been largely 
documented during the recent migration crisis in Europe.
Another way of dampening migration flows is through increased internal 
controls in destination countries, i.e. deportations of undocumented workers 
or fines to their employers, which decrease the expected pay-offs of economic 
migration. However, as compared to border controls, these measures have 
distinct effects on the smuggling market as they push down prices charged 
by smugglers since they decrease the demand for their services.
What we learn from this framework is that policies targeting the demand 
or the supply side of the human smuggling market tend to decrease migration
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flows. However, they have very different effects on the amount of resources
feeding illegal activities if they target the supply side or the demand side.
Moreover, the effectiveness of stricter border controls at decreasing the num-
ber of illegal migrants strongly depends on the availability of other migra-
tion channels. The evidence presented next section illustrates these findings,
showing that continuous reinforcements of the Mexico-US border turned out
to be costly and mostly ineffective, while the effectiveness of policies targeting
the demand side of the market is under-researched and unknown.
2.3 Empirical evidence
So what do we know about the effectiveness of migration controls? In the last
decades, most OECD countries have continuously increased border controls.
This resulted in a huge discrepancy between the resources allocated to enforce
external versus internal controls of illegal migration.
Regarding border controls, the most serious quantitative studies combin-
ing detailed evidence on flows of illegal migrants and regional statistics on
resources allocated to border controls are on the US border with Mexico. In
the decades following the Immigration Reform and Control Act on migration,
the additional investments allocated to protect the borders did not decrease
significantly the flows of undocumented workers to the US. But it had the
effect of increasing smugglers’ fees. Migration costs were further increased by
higher opportunity costs of crossing borders using further away routes (Gath-
man 2008). And this also increased human losses and other risks entailed by
the illegal crossing on more dangerous routes, with the help of smugglers or
by own means.
What about internal controls? The example of the US is again illumina-
tive. Hanson (2007) highlights the strikingly low levels of enforcement against
illegal migration at the worksite. Between 1999 and 2003 the number of man
hours devoted to worksite inspections declined from 480,000 to 180,000 hours
and very few employers of illegal migrants are prosecuted: the number of US
employers paying fines of at least $5,000 for hiring unauthorized workers were
15 in 1990, 12 in 1994 and 0 in 2004. During the same period, the number of
man hours policing the border increased 2.9 times while the number of hours
to detect undocumented labour on the worksite was divided by 2.6 and con-
siderable amounts of investments have been allocated to build border fences,
walls, and spikes which have been estimated to cost several billion annually.
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This is also true for many OECD countries, where borders have been
reinforced as a response to political pressures but where internal controls
remained extremely lax. For example, in France, in 2008, large firms have a
1.42 percent probability of being inspected each year and small firms face a 0
probability of inspection while at the same time hundred of millions of euros
are spent at police patrol at the border, dismantling illegal migrants’ camps
and deportation measures. Given the sensitivity of public opinions, most of
these statistics are coming from patchy reports by different ministries. They
are not systematically collected nor analysed to assess the cost-effectiveness
of migration controls. But existing evidence points to huge imbalances in
allocations of investments into border controls versus internal controls, which
are clearly sub-optimal if the sole policy objective were to tighten illegal
migration.
3 Legalisation
Reinforcing border controls is very costly and is not very effective at further
restricting illegal migration flows. Moreover, like any prohibition, migration
restrictions generate a demand for illegal services and increase the amounts
of resources going into the hands of smugglers, which are feeding illegal activ-
ities of all sorts (corruption, money laundering, violence, terrorism, slavery,
etc) and strengthening their networks. Given all the negative externalities
generated by this illegal market, are there alternative policies?
3.1 Free labour migration
A first simple idea is to open borders. This has the obvious advantage of
legalising migration flows, hence eliminating human smuggling. This also
allows to generate sizeable economic gains for both sending and destination
countries. This solution is advocated by an important number of researchers
from all fields of social sciences (political scientists Michel Agier and Francois
Gemmene, economists such as Michael Clemens) and is justified by strong
philosophical, humanitarian, and economic grounds. It also feeds interest-
ing research about the size of migration flows that would be generated and
of the associated economic gains. Findings hinge crucially on a few key
assumptions, in particular regarding the transferability of institutions and
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technologies, the degree of complementarities between native workers and
immigrants, the speed of assimilation of immigrants. But the main obstacle
to this proposal remains its lack of democratic support in today’s societies.
Given this constraint, a more promising approach for policy makers is to
consider less extreme solutions, which would allow destination countries to
both control migration flows and weaken human smuggling.
3.2 Sale of visas
Another idea is to use some market based approach to restrict the number of
migrants by selling visas. This idea has already fed many debates in blogs,
the general press, and been discussed by prominent economists such as Gary
Becker. Its opponents have warned against using such market tools which can
generate a new kind of bonded labour between indebted migrants and their
employers. The advantages are several: a sale of visas allows to restrict flows
to those who are able and willing to pay to enter and participate in the club
of rich societies and this may gain more democratic support in destination
countries than free migration. From an economic perspective, workers can
come legally, instead of having illegal migrants feeding smugglers and the
underground economy. They can thus be controlled and taxed, while raising
additional resources for the economy through the sale of visas, which can be
organised in different ways (for example through auctions). Moreover, legal
migrants can officially ask for loans and rely on legal institutions, which
should reduce abusive contracts between indebted migrants and traffickers of
all kinds.
In spite of these debates, the sale of visas has so far never been seriously
considered as a way of fighting against smugglers. In our companion paper
(Auriol and Mesnard 2016) we clearly demonstrate that it is difficult to win
on all fronts.
One problem raised by this proposal is that selling visas at the same price
as the smugglers’ fees or higher is not enough to eliminate smugglers. They
will indeed respond by decreasing the price they propose for their services.
This will attract lower skilled workers who may prefer to pay a lower price
by migrating illegally, albeit taking higher risks. Lower prices proposed by
smugglers will attract more candidates to migration. This will occur unless
the price of visas is set so low that smugglers cannot compete any longer
without making losses. It is also possible to set the price of visas above
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this “exit” price and still compete with smugglers by capturing part of their
demand. As compared to illegal migration, legal migration with a visa is
free of risk, and would hence attract many candidates who prefer to pay a
premium for a visa rather than using services of smugglers. Since smugglers
will always respond by lowering their prices, and at the extreme, be pushed
out of business, a sale of visas will necessarily increase the overall flows of
immigrants.
3.3 A Policy Mix
It is common to oppose these two types of public intervention, legalisation
and repression, in political debates. In the US for example, people on the
right and Republicans are typically accusing Democrats of being soft on the
issue of illegal migration: “While Democrats believe in supporting a path
to citizenship for illegal immigrants, Republicans support stronger border
patrols and stronger repercussions for those caught in the U.S. illegally, as
well as those who employ them or help them falsify documentation.”8
These public discourses seem to imply a trade-off between controlling the
number of migrants flowing into destination countries and legalising migra-
tion: either reinforced external controls are put in place to limit migration
flows but such barriers to legal migration generate a demand for human smug-
glers’ services; or legalisation through a sale of visas at the “exit price” or
higher weakens human smuggling businesses, but this necessarily increases
migration flows. Yet our analysis shows that legalisation of migration through
the sale of visas and significant investment in reinforced controls are comple-
mentary.
An optimal public policy should combine legalisation and tighter controls
to reach the two goals of controlling migration flows and weakening human
smugglers. To squeeze smugglers’ profits, the price of visas has to be set
at a low level, which is such that, given their costs to operate, they can no
longer propose low-cost services without going bankrupt. But this can be
done more easily as smugglers’ costs to operate increase or as the demand
for smugglers’ services decreases. For example, reinforcing police patrols at
the border increases smugglers’ costs to operate. Or reinforcing sanctions
of employers of illegal migrants or deportations of illegal workers dampen
8In Democratic View on Immigration October 2014 by republicanviews.org 
http://www.republicanviews.org/democratic-view-on-immigration/
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economic pay-offs of illegal migration. This in turn decreases the demand
for human smugglers’ services and contributes to squeeze smugglers’ profits.
This is why smugglers are more easily pushed out of business with a Policy
Mix.
Our findings show that, with reinforced controls, a sale of visas does not
need to be at very low price to push smugglers out of the market. In practice,
the “exit price” of visa increases with the resources invested in reinforcing
controls. Another advantage of this Policy Mix is that it raises public funds
through the sale of visas and additional resources from fines to sanctioned
employers.
What about the effects on the skill composition of migration flows? It
is easy to show that whatever the selection of migrants under status quo,
the Policy Mix we propose will increase their diversity. This means that
if smuggled migrants are from the higher bound of the skill distribution, a
larger pool of immigrants entering the country following the Policy Mix will
include migrants from intermediary skill levels. And if migrants are from
the lower bound of the skill distribution the Policy Mix will attract more
migrants with higher skill levels. This increased skill diversity can be seen
as another advantage for the economy.
Of course which kind of controls are reinforced to limit the increase in the
flows of immigrants is not neutral in the policy debate as targeting smugglers,
illegal migrants or their employers does not have the same political, well-being
and economic effects. Also it does not have the same cost-effectiveness, an
important point to which we return below.
4 Policy simulations
Since our framework of analysis focuses on the migration market and ab-
stracts from other changes that may occur in the rest of the economy as a
consequence of increases in migration flows, the results below are not full-
fledged policy simulations. In particular, adjustments on the labour market
may dampen the initial incentives to migrate, leading to smaller increases
in migration flows following sale of visas than the ones we calibrate. Yet
they illuminate the strong complementarities existing between legalisation
and enforcing controls and give higher bounds of the predictable changes.
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4.1 An example: The China-US route
We borrow most of the estimates used in our calibrations from Friebel and 
Guriev, 2006, and from the scarce information we have on the smuggling 
industry from case-studies on Chinese smugglers such as Gao and Poisson, 
2005. For all our simulations we need some estimates of the degree of risk 
aversion of would-be migrants, a, and of the deportation probabilities q, 
which are typically difficult to observe. Instead, we have some direct evidence 
from Chinese smugglers reporting their marginal costs to operate at around 
e8000 to cross the borders to France and higher to the US (Gao and Poisson, 
2005), which we estimate to be around $10000 for our simulations.This is 
an average. Marginal costs vary depending on the type of migrant and of 
trip undertaken. Some Chinese migrants obtain fake visas and invitations 
for business trips, which allow them to travel by air. Others have to cross 
several borders using several intermediary smugglers, which increases the 
overall marginal costs of the operation.
Using the information on marginal cost, the information on the lower 
bound of the price paid by Chinese to migrate illegally to the US, that is 
estimated to be at around $35000 we can infer from our model a range of 
risk parameters a compatible with a set of deportation probabilities q be-
tween 0.2 and 0.7 (see Auriol and Mesnard, 2012).9 The compatible pairs 
are presented in the first and second row of Table 1 under the assumption 
that the number of smugglers network is N = 2. We then perform some 
comparative static exercises on the effects of varying the risk q in the neigh-
bourhood of each chosen value presented in each column. Finally, as there 
is very little quantitative information on the degree of market concentration, 
the Appendix analyses the sensitivity of our results when the number of 
smugglers increases to N = 3 or N = 5. For example Chin and Zhang, 2002, 
stress the existence of several smugglers’ networks operating in China.10
9Given the scarcity of information we have on these illegal activities, on the risk of 
deportation, and on the risk aversion related to migration decisions, one should take these 
calibrations as illustrative only.
10Comparing results of Table 1 with those in Tables A1 and A2 shows that the efforts 
required to eliminate the smugglers and maintain migration demand constant are smaller 
the higher the number of smugglers on the market, an intuitive result. It is indeed less 
difficult to fight against smugglers when their initial profit is low, which decreases with 
the level of competition.
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degree of risk aversion a 0.00000086 0.00001 0.00004
probability of deportation q 0.68 0.7 0.72 0.48 0.5 0.52 0.18 0.2 0.22
Policy Aim: eradicate smuggling...
exit price p 43624 46575 49954 28232 29516 30924 17755 18336 18957
migration flows (relative increase) ∆D 0.43 0.49 0.55 0.32 0.36 0.41 0.20 0.24 0.30
...with zero migration increase:
smuggling costs (relative increase) ∆c 2.73 2.50 2.26 2.67 2.50 2.33 2.70 2.50 2.32
discount of illegal earnings (rel.inc.) ∆δ -0.48 -0.47 -0.46 -0.51 -0.51 -0.50 -0.53 -0.53 -0.52
Note: prices p are in USD.
Row 4 of Table 1 simulates the visa price, p in USD, that would eradicate
smugglers following a pure “visa sale” scheme - i.e. not using the available
instruments to control migration flows. And row 5 simulates the subsequent
relative increase in migration demand, ∆D. Both p and ∆D increase with
the risk of deportation q, an intuitive result since the attractiveness of legal
migration increases as the risk of deportation increases. For instance we can
see in column 1 that with a risk of deportation of 70 percent the exit price
(i.e., the price of visas that pushes smugglers out of the market) is close to
$50000, while the increase of migration flows following this selling scheme
would be 50 percent as compared to the status quo.
We next allow the government to combine sale of visas with repressive
instruments to achieve the double objective of migration control and legali-
sation. We study how the different repressive instruments may be combined
with a sale of visas to reach a “0 migration increase” objective while eradi-
cating human smuggling. Policy makers may first consider reinforcing border
controls, which increases marginal costs for smugglers to operate. Row 7 of
Table 1 shows that the relative increase in marginal costs necessary to reach
this objective, ∆c, is substantial, around 250 percent, and decreases with the
probability of deportation.
Policy makers could alternatively reinforce the sanctions to employers of
undocumented workers, which translates into lower wages offered to undoc-
umented workers. Row 8 of Table 1 shows that this policy would require
decreasing the discount factor of illegal wages, δ, by around 50 percent, such
that the earnings of workers employed in the illegal sector of the economy
falls below 40 percent of those of same skill workers in the legal sector.11
11Current studies have estimated this parameter to be at around 0.8 in the US.
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Table 1: Policy implications for N = 2.
4.2 Discussion
These simulations show that the additional efforts required to combine a sale
of visas with migration control decrease sharply with the risk of deportation,
or more generally with any parameter affecting the expected gains from il-
legal migration. Indeed, when workers have lower expected gains, smugglers
have to lower their margin to be able to attract them. It is therefore easier to
drive them out of business and control migration flows when either the risk of
deportation increases or wages and opportunities to work illegally decrease.
In other words, our results highlight strong complementarities between dif-
ferent types of repressive instruments and sale of visas.
Of course, the set of policy objectives policy makers may consider is
much broader than the extreme objectives used for the simulations above.
In particular, complete legalisation -i.e. eliminating all smugglers from the
market- may not be feasible at reasonable costs and having very few small
smugglers, badly organised, and operating small scale businesses may not be
such a big issue for policy makers. Similarly, societies may not want to freeze
migration flows to their existing levels but rather increase them as migrants
fuel the economy, boost the demography, increase diversity and innovation.
All our model predicts is that it is possible to design a Policy Mix combining
repressive instruments and a visa selling scheme to reach the targets that
only policy makers and societies can determine. This objective can be set in
terms of total number of migrants entering a destination country and their
composition (share of legal/illegal ones).
However, in practice the Policy Mix may be difficult to fine-tune as it
requires to know the cost-effectiveness of current repressive measures, which
may target the smugglers, the illegal migrants, or their employers. Without
more systematic quantitative evaluations of migration policies, it will be
difficult to simulate the optimal combination of repressive instruments and
market tools, which are required to achieve predetermined objectives.
If fine-tuning might be tricky, our results regarding the complementarities
of instruments call into question the rationale of current policies. In the past
decades border controls have been constantly reinforced in spite of very small
effects, at the margin, on migration flows and there are large discrepancies
in most OECD countries between the amounts invested in border control
versus employer’s sanctions. Given these discrepancies and the availability
of new technologies, reinforcing systematic controls of undocumented work-
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ers at the workplace may offer a more efficient means of dampening illegal
labour migration flows than reinforcing border controls. It is striking that
despite several attempts to mandate participation by all U.S. employers in
the E-Verify program, an Internet-based system designed to check the em-
ployment authorization status of employees, participation is still voluntary,
with limited exceptions. Small businesses and agricultural employers are
strongly opposed to mandatory E-Verify and actively lobby against it. Sim-
ilarly, within the European Union, representatives of Business Europe are
opposed to the Commission’s idea that employers should check the validity
of residence permits to avoid the risk of being excluded from public contracts
and, under certain circumstances, penalised by temporary or permanent clo-
sure of their companies in case of failure.
5 Current legalisation policies
5.1 Migration quotas and visas
We may also consider other ways of multiplying legal channels to migrate.
Currently, most countries grant visas to some individuals, who are eligible
under specific criteria, and given free rights to enter their territory albeit
small administrative fees. These criteria vary depending on the needs of des-
tination economies (for example filling specific labour market shortages) and
the push factors in origin countries (for example flows of climatic refugees or
political refugees). Rights to settle permanently or not, in combination with
more or less extensive set of rights (work, social benefits, family reunion) are
thereby given to a selected number of people based on very different grounds
-work visas to fulfill labour market shortages, asylum to offer protection to
refugees guaranteed by international laws (Geneva convention)- which may
be controversial when they relate to ethnicity, religion or “common” history.
Quotas are equivalent to putting a zero price to migrate for some eligible
individuals and infinite price to the others. Therefore a system of migration
based on quotas also raises important ethical issues. There is a need to justify
why certain types of individuals get some rights whereas others do not, which
in the case of asylum seekers is quite easy but less easy in other instances.
Moreover, from a practical viewpoint, a system of quotas may be difficult to
implement as it has to be flexible, determined in a dynamic way to follow
the situation of both sending and receiving countries and adjust the number
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and type of immigrants to evolving economic and political situations. Last
but not least, quotas imply some rationing, which can be organised in various
ways: tightening the criteria of eligibility; increasing administrative obstacles
(fees, queuing); lotteries, which overcome some of the aforementioned ethical
issues. And this generates incentives to migrate illegally for individuals who
are not eligible.
5.2 Visas for sale
In practice many OECD countries already sell visas of at least two different
types. A first type of visas are sold at very high prices to few investors and
entrepreneurs in order to boost businesses, capital investments or simply
attract revenues. This is for instance the case in Malta (650 000 euros),
Australia, United Kingdom (1.5 millions dollars in bonds), United-State of
America, (visa EB-5 in exchange of 500 000 dollars productive investment),
Singapore (2 million dollars), Netherland, Mauritius, Spain (500 000 euros
investment in real estate), Greece (250 000 euros investment in real estate),
Portugal (500 000 euros investment in real estate), France (10 million euros),
various Caribbean islands...
At the other end of the spectrum, some countries such as Israel, Cyprus,
Jordan and Lebanon have been regulating long distance migration of cheap
labour through local agencies located in South-East Asian countries such
as Philippines and Sri Lanka. These legal intermediaries screen the candi-
dates and organise their shipment for a relatively low price, which is also
co-financed by employers to compensate for shortages in labour.12
The obvious advantage of these visas is to attract cheap temporary labour
force or other scarce resources (capital, investments, or revenue), who are all
contributing to the host economies. This clearly shows that selling visas is
possible and not incompatible with current existing legal frameworks in most
countries. The price of visa can be seen as an entry ticket paid by migrants
to participate in these economies. For example Chinese investors obtain the
right to enter the European market.
12Canada also offers visas for temporary workers, which are highly successful. In 
2011, more than 192,000 foreign workers entered Canada under this Program, see
Fact Sheet http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/employers/temp-foreign-
worker-program.asp
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However, these policies are fundamentally different from our visa selling
scheme as they do not aim at weakening smugglers but only at fulfilling
specific economic needs. Indeed, if the price of visa is set at a very high
level, as is the case with investor visas, it does not compete with smugglers:
smugglers offer lower-costs services to illegal migrants and can still capture
a very large demand. And pricing temporary work visas relatively low but
restricting their number also generates an illegal market for those who are
not successful.
5.3 An application to the refugee crisis?
Under the current international laws refugees can apply for asylum and le-
galise their status upon arrival in safe countries. However, the political con-
texts in many origin countries have created an emergency situation where
too many asylum seekers are stuck in refugee camps in origin, transit or des-
tination countries where they are either queuing for a very long time before
their claims are processed or undertaking perilous journeys to cross borders
illegally. This system is costly and generates a real humanitarian crisis.
Selling visas is not the solution to this crisis which needs to be grounded
on other principles than those relevant for economic migrants. However, our
proposal improves the situation of refugees as well, as it offers them legal
channels to quickly and safely leave their country of origin. The rationale of
our policy is again to compete and weaken human smugglers and traffickers
by offering legal services to all would-be migrants.
One ethical way to proceed for refugees would be to combine this scheme
with refunds of visas (cash transfers) for those who are successfully claiming
for asylum ex-post (ex-ante). For the other ones, who are more likely to
be economic migrants, the Mix Policy we propose would still offer a better
option than using the help of smugglers. Of course, this would only partially
alleviate some very important concerns, in particular those related to the
subletting of refugee camps to third countries and to abuses of human rights
while crossing borders with the help of smugglers. But the funding, political,
and international coordination issues about how to share the responsibility
of all refugees would remain open.
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6 Conclusions
In the past decades border controls have been constantly reinforced without
significant effects on the flows of illegal migrants. It is also striking that,
at the same time, controls of legal status of workers on the worksite have
been so little enforced in spite of technological progress of biometry and of
e-administration in general.
The current policies clearly reflect a complex political-economy equilib-
rium. Tough policy declarations concerning deportations of illegal immi-
grants are orientated towards electors while the absence of inspections on
the worksite and of sanctions of employers benefits enterprises. This may
explain why human smuggling is a booming business and that many illegal
migrants are still exploited by criminal networks, while risking their life and,
when successful at crossing borders, risking every day to be deported.
Another policy is possible in the UK like in Europe and it is an emer-
gency to think seriously about it. This policy would involve a reallocation
of resources to enforce sanctions against illegal work and the multiplication
of legal channels offered to would-be migrants to cross the borders legally
instead of illegally. This also involves designing new instruments to break
the economic incentives of smugglers to operate and push them out of busi-
ness. This is what an innovative visa selling scheme open to all candidates
to migration can achieve, which would complement existing legal channels
offered to selected migrants and asylum seekers and raise additional resources
to finance complementary public policies.
Simulations based on scarce evidence and crude parameters borrowed
from the economic and sociological literature illustrate the complementarities
between such visa scheme and more traditional repressive measures. They
offer some calibrations of higher bounds of expected effects on migration flows
under alternative scenarios. However, more empirical work and systematic
collection of data is needed to assess quantitatively current migration policies
and fine-tune the innovative Policy Mix we propose.
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Appendix: Sensitivity analysis when the number of smugglers
on the market varies
For our simulations above we assumed that N = 2. We now turn to testing
the sensitivity of our results when the market for smugglers is more
competitive, assuming successively N = 3 and N = 5 smugglers’ networks.
Simulations presented in the tables A1 and A2 show the magnitude of all
implied changes. Note that, similarly as above, the degrees of risk aversion
and deportation probabilities displayed in the first two rows of each table have
been chosen to be compatible with the information c = 10000 and the
smugglers’ fees around $35000 characterising this route.
Table A1: Policy implications for N=3.
a 0.000002 0.000008 0.000015 0.000035
q 0.58 0.6 0.62 0.48 0.5 0.52 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.18 0.2 0.22
p 33361 35069 36961 27621 28819 30127 23429 24319 25280 17650 18211 18810
∆D 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.20 0.23
∆c 2.68 2.50 2.32 2.66 2.50 2.34 2.65 2.50 2.35 2.68 2.50 2.33
∆δ -0.48 -0.47 -0.46 -0.50 -0.49 -0.48 -0.51 -0.50 -0.49 -0.52 -0.51 -0.51
Note: prices p are in USD
Table A2: Policy implications for N=5.
a 0.0000005 0.000005 0.000026
q 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.18 0.2 0.22
p 24749 25670 26663 22658 23446 24291 17414 17932 18481
∆D 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.17
∆c 2.63 2.50 2.37 2.63 2.50 2.37 2.64 2.50 2.36
∆δ -0.46 -0.45 -0.44 -0.48 -0.47 -0.47 -0.50 -0.49 -0.49
Note: prices p are in USD
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